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Marx’s inquiry and presentation: The pedagogical constellations of the Grundrisse and
Capital
Introduction:
Within the burgeoning literature on learning and studying and their respective relationships to
capitalism and communism, there hasn’t yet been an examination of Marx’s pedagogies as they
manifest in his writings. While the revolutionary or disruptive possibilities of studying relative to
capitalism and neoliberalism have produced crucial insights (e.g., Ford, 2017b; Lewis and
Friedrich, 2016; Malott, 2021; Meyerhoff, 2019), these generally haven’t engaged Marx’s own
pedagogical processes. Elsewhere, I mined Marx’s three volumes of Capital for a magical
marxist pedagogy (Ford, 2017a). Here, however, I want to turn to Marx’s pedagogical
constellations of learning and studying as they show up variously in readings of the Grundrisse
and Capital, focusing on the distinction between inquiry and presentation, which I translate into
distinct educational logics of learning and studying. In doing so, I show both continuities and
differences between different readings of both texts, which I argue demonstrate that Marx
consistently engaged in and performed both pedagogical logics, but in distinct ways at different
times, sometimes as an intentional tactic and others as a contingency of the workers’ struggle.
Writing in our neoliberal era, educational scholars have identified the dominance of
learning as a key problem in creating a non-capitalist or communist world. Learning is guided by
pre-determined ends, upholds binary distinctions between ignorance and intelligence,
amateurism and professionalism, students and teachers, and so on. Learning is a developmental
process that moves from the former to the latter by various means (constructivist, studentcentered, dialogical, etc.). It is about the actualization of a pre-existing potential. Only on this
basis can learning be measured, quantified, and assessed. Learning is attached to productivity, to
“immediate utility in daily life” (Lewis and Friedrich, 2016, p. 237). Learning, then, “is more or
less a linear process that unfolds chronologically toward maximum outputs” (p. 238).
Studying, on the other hand, encompasses various practices that interrupt, delay, and
deactivate learning. While studying, one might have a pre-determined end goal in mind, but that
is quickly suspended as the studier finds themselves lost, wandering, and straying in
unpredictable and unforeseeable ways. As such, studying is a pedagogical style that renders
existing and foreordained ways of being inoperative and, by doing so, it opens up the
possibilities of what can be as the dictates of what is are suspended. As one example, Lewis and
Friedrich (2016) propose tinkering as a form of studying. While tinkering, the student frees an
object or process from any predetermined ends and “the instrumentality” of learning “and the
success conditions determining proper vs. improper, success vs. failure are suspended
indefinitely” (p. 240). Or, as Weili Zhao (2020) succinctly puts it, the “studier is supposed to
forget-suspend its presuppositions and identities, ready to be ex-posed to some signatures hidden
sporadically between the lines, evoked to what is unsaid or unresolved aporia, and/or provoked
to elaborate the unsaid/aporia toward generating new possibilities” (p. 322).
Learning and studying have been conceptualized as alternative or oppositional logics, yet
most scholars agree that there is a necessarily relationship between the two. After all, it is only
after learning to read a text that one can study it. For Lewis (2014), studying leaves traces in the
product of learning, while for Ford (2016) the task is to navigate between the two processes, a
task he assigns to the Communist Party. It may be that the relationship between the two is

ultimately contingent upon a variety of factors, from the dominant mode of production to the
state of the class struggle.
In this paper, I turn to different readings of Marx’s writing to excavate his own
navigational process, and I do this by focusing on the Grundrisse and Capital and showing how
Marx’s own distinction between inquiry and presentation isn’t so rigid and, as a result, those who
argue in favor of one book over the other do so because they fail to recognize his pedagogical
tact. I follow Althusser’s (1979) notion that “there is no such thing as an innocent reading” (p.
14), and that neither Marx, the interpretations engaged here, nor those that I develop here are
objective or neutral. In fact, as Althusser (2006) writes in a later work, it’s crucial that Marx was
only able to write Capital because of his own experiences in the workers’ movement. The sense
in which Marx claimed he wasn’t a marxist was, as Althusser reminds us, to reject “the idea,
‘obvious’ to everyone at the time, that he, the individual Marx, the intellectual Marx, could be
the intellectual or even political author… For it was the real—the workers’ class struggle—
which acted as the true author (the agent)” (18). This is what Marx means when he writes that
critical science can only be done by the proletarian class: it isn’t Marx but the class struggle that
theorizes and, as such, cannot but do so in a strictly partisan manner.
From the Grundrisse to Capital and back again?
Marx’s Grundrisse, a series of notes written in the frantic days of 1857-1858, are seen by some,
as preparatory research for his magnum opus, Capital, especially the first volume, the only one
published (and republished) during Marx’s lifetime. For Louis Althusser (1971), it is Capital that
constitutes the one text by which “Marx has to be judged” (p. 45). For others, the notebooks
represent a work of Marx in their own right, one that’s distinct from and even superior to
Capital. Antonio Negri (1991), for example, understands the Grundrisse as an explicitly political
text, a more marxist text than Capital precisely because of its “incredible openness” and its
emphasis on antagonistic subjectivity (p. 9). Capital, according to Negri, is not only fragmentary
but closed, determinate, and objective, a book where antagonisms are resolved dialectically,
foreclosing the subjective rupture that communist revolution requires. Others insist that we read
them together, not necessarily to provide a final or perfect account of Marxism, but rather
because such a co-reading generates new insights. George Caffentzis (2013), for example, insists
that the animating forces of communism in the Grundrisse aren’t negated in Capital but are
rather “mutated in an ingenious way” (p. 270). Taken together, both present different—but not
contradictory—aspects of capital’s contemporary forms of exploitation and of proletarian forms
of resistance.
My intention in this article is not to defend one reading against another to say one is a
“correct” versus an “incorrect” interpretation of Marx. In some ways, my wager is that the
different presentations are legitimate and productive for the communist struggle. Such a wager,
however, is contingent upon an appreciation of Marx’s pedagogy, and in particular his
heterogenous blocking together of learning and studying. I locate these distinct pedagogical
logics in Marx’s afterword to the second German edition of the first volume of Capital, where
Marx distinguishes the Forschung from the Darstellung, or the practice or method of research
from that of presentation. Here Marx is responding to an assessment of Capital that appeared in
an 1872 edition of the European Messenger based in St. Petersburg. The assessment focuses on

Marx’s method of presentation and commends Marx for showing the laws of capitalism and of
social transformation.
Marx claims this is ultimately an affirmation of his anti-Hegelian dialectic, but before
clarifying his dialectic, he briefly notes the necessary differences between inquiry and
formulation, a difference I take as pedagogical. “Of course,” Marx (1867/1967) writes, “the
method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry.” Inquiry, or what I’m calling
studying, “has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development,
to trace out their inner connexion.” The method of presentation, or what I’m calling learning,
occurs only after this is accomplished. “Only after this work is done,” he says, “can the actual
movement be adequately described” (p. 28). I argue that Marx is describing two different
pedagogies—or educational processes or logics—here.
The first, the method of inquiry, is one that examines material in all of its nuances and
relationships, tracing out the different lineages, past, present, and future potential forms of
development, and how they each interdepend on and transform each other. As Marx (1939/1973)
put it in the 1857 Introduction in the Grundrisse, you move from the world as it is—in our
“chaotic conception… of the whole” to transition “from the imagined concrete towards ever
thinner abstractions.” Yet “from there the journey would have to be retraced” so that the world in
its concreteness is “a rich totality of many determinations and relations” (p. 100). This is the
pedagogy of studying. Studying or researching is a process that entails wandering around,
looking for connections, developing and proposing abstractions and determinations, thinking
you’re onto something and then following it to a dead end, generating ideas, getting lost in the
archives (or on YouTube or the internet), journeying out and wandering or wondering around.
When Marx was studying, he had an end in mind: he wanted to understand the inner logics and
dynamics of capital, how these came to be, what impact they had and might have on the world,
and how the contradictions can be seized during the class struggle.
Only once you’ve adequately done this can you turn to presenting your findings. The
presentation takes a totally different form. It begins with conceptual building blocks and
proceeds linearly in a developmental manner. This is why Marx, in Capital, often casts aside the
historical beginnings of capitalism and leaves it to the very end, in the last part where we finally
learn that it was through slavery, colonialism, legal and extralegal theft, individual and state
violence, repression, and so on that capitalism came to be. But he doesn’t begin here because he
doesn’t want us to 1) think this is the complete and global story of how capital came to me; 2)
think it’s not going on today; and 3) because he simply wants us to understand the inner logic of
capitalism as it was most fully developed in England by giving the mainstream politicaleconomists a fair reading.
What you have in Capital is a pedagogy of learning that begins with something simple
and obvious (the commodity), and then goes deeper and deeper until we see that this “trivial”
appearing thing is a series of ongoing struggles: between and within classes and the state that
play out differently over history, that assume different forms (like technology and machinery),
and so on. But first we have to get the concept of surplus-value before any of this makes sense,
and in order to do that we have to get to the basics of commodities, their two-fold nature,
circulation, money, and so on. Learning or presentation, that is, is a developmental process that is
more or less linear, advancing from the partial to the complete so that if “done successfully… it
may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction” (Marx, 1867/1967, p. 28).
Yet Marx’s distinction here isn’t as firm as it appears. Marx sought to understand,
articulate, learn, and relay the precise logics of capital, of its contradictions, and of how the

working class has and can seize on these contradictions to institute the revolutionary transition to
communism. At the same time, he knew he couldn’t do this because no one can fully delineate
and learn about capitalism so long as it exists, as capital is by definition a dynamic social
relation. Andy Merrifield’s recent reading of Capital seems to affirm this. Merrifield (2020)
writes that “Marx never wanted to finish Capital because he couldn’t see how it could ever be
finished. He sought the definitive but knew the impossibility of the definitive. It tormented him”
(p. 15). Indeed, when one reads the various outlines that Marx presented for Capital in the
Grundrisse and elsewhere, it’s clear that Marx was taking on a project he knew he could never
finish. He wanted to write volumes on the state, the world market, foreign trade, wages, the
history of theory, and more. Even in the first volume of Capital, we see traces of Marx’s
interminable studying in the various places he notes an absolutely crucial point—one we must
understand—only to move on and say he can’t address it here and it will have to wait until later,
until he’s returned to studying. Sometimes, like when he brings up credit and rent in volume 1,
he does return in volume 3. But other times, like when he brings up violations of the ideal law of
exchanges, he never does because as a pedagogical text, Capital is more developmental.
As a result, Marx’s pedagogies of learning and studying should be seen as constellations.
Drawing on Walter Benjamin, Lewis (2012) maps out educational marxisms and contends that
we should neither defend one at the expense of another nor put them as dots on a timeline
unfolding into a completed dialectic synthesis or “final Marxist ‘solution.’” Instead, he argues
we should approach them as constellations, which don’t “resolve tensions within and between
competing theories” and instead finds “that such tensions are productive indexes that both
connect and disconnect singular theoretical registers” (p. 99). Marx’s pedagogical methods—
deployed while writing and researching—are best viewed in this way, as “hang[ing] precariously
together, maintaining an absent center” (p. 112). It is not that one subsumes the other or that they
eventually transcend their differences in a unity. As this paper shows, both are found together in
both the Grundrisse and Capital, although we see different gaps and frictions in each.
Moreover, this paper argues that we shouldn’t take different readings of Marx’s work as
primarily correct or incorrect, siding with one over the other or trying to reconcile their
singularities. As such, the argument is fundamentally different from that of David Neilson (2021)
who argues that Althusser’s reading of Capital “implies mis-reading or non-reading” it (p. 1) as
opposed his own which is, according to his own account, “grounded in a critical but faithful
interrogation of Marx’s texts” (p. 3). To be faithful to Marx is to learn and study not works of
Marx’s and his interpreters—and most importantly the ongoing history of the international
struggle of working and oppressed peoples)—in order to organize and prepare for a
revolutionary rupture and build the dictatorship of the proletariat. This doesn’t mean there is the
absence of polemical debates but rather that such debates are based on revolutionary optimism
(Chambers, 2020) that rejects the notion that the masses “are chained and have no power” (p. 4)
and that any one particular reading of Marx is “stifling its [marxisms] agency” (Neilson, 2021, p.
3). In order to make the strategic shifts and tactical alliances necessary to advance the class
struggle, we should maintain the flexibility that constellational thinking allows.
The pedagogies of the Grundrisse
Marx’s pedagogical gestures here testify to the necessity of both educational praxes. Importantly,
however, his movements between learning and studying, while sometimes tactical decisions,
weren’t dictated by some inner genius but by the twists and turns of the workers’ movement and,

undoubtedly, his own health. Marx’s serious study of political economy began after the failure of
the 1848 bourgeois-democratic revolutions, after which he was exiled to London. He didn’t see
another uprising on the agenda, and so he set to work studying and writing. While he initially
introduced his own political and economic categories with The German Ideology, his serious
study didn’t begin until much later, in the early 1850s. But when another uprising happened, like
the Paris Commune, Marx turned to examine that instead of continuing work on Capital. He
pushed the publication of volume 2 because he wanted to see how the early 1970s economic
crisis turned out.
Marx’s notes that were eventually published as the Grundrisse: Foundations of the
Critique of Political Economy (rough draft) were penned during the financial crisis of 1856-7, a
crisis that spurred Marx on a frenzy of study. He had a clear goal in mind: to articulate the inner
logics and dynamics of capitalism, to critique bourgeois political economy, to lay out a method,
and to identify what contradictions could galvanize the revolution. But they were a series of
notes, abandoned by Marx and only published first in 1939 in the Soviet Union and made
available in Europe and the U.S. during the 1960s-1970s. As notes, they’re traces of studying,
which, as Eric Hobsbawm (1964) notes, were “written in a sort of private intellectual shorthand
which is sometimes impenetrable, in the form of rough notes interspersed with asides which,
however clear they may have been to Marx, are often ambiguous to us” (p. 10). As a result,
“anyone who has tried to translate the manuscript or even to study and interpret it, will know that
it is sometimes quite impossible to put the meaning of some sibylline passage beyond all reasonable doubt” (p. 10). It’s for this reason that an edited collection of scholarship on the Grundrisse
refers to the book as “a veritable ‘laboratory’” (Bellofiore, Starosta, & Thomas, 2013, p. 3).
Simon Choat’s reading emphasizes that the texts were Marx developing concepts, so the
notebooks “are dense and elliptical” (p. 1). Because Marx is studying—that is, producing,
following, wondering about, and sometimes losing—concepts as he goes, Hobsbawm (1964)
says it let us “follow Marx while he is actually thinking” (p. 64).
Negri’s 1978 Paris lectures on the Grundrisse, delivered at the invitation of Louis
Althusser, represent the most partisan approach to the book. It’s not that Negri dismisses Capital,
of course, but that he emphasizes the book only represents one aspect of Marxism. The
Grundrisse is an endless unfolding of antagonisms produced by and productive of revolutionary
subjectivity. Capital, on the contrary, is more limited precisely because of its “categorical
presentation” (Negri, 1991, p. 8). Pedagogically speaking, the Grundrisse’s traces of studying
open more prospects for revolution that the developmental learning of Capital closes down. The
difference turns on antagonism and dialectics. The Grundrisse proceeds by way of antagonism,
whereas Capital proceeds by way of dialectics (which Negri claims is closed and formulaic). Yet
the dialectic for Marx is absolutely crucial in both Capital and the Grundrisse. At the same time,
the pedagogical dialectic between learning and studying, for Negri, is incorrectly applied
politically in Capital because of its privileging of presentation and learning, while in the
Grundrisse is a text of studying that includes learning but prioritizes the class struggle, or the
pedagogical form of the Grundrisse is “open on all sides: every conclusion that takes the form of
a presentation of the research open spaces to new research and presentation” (p. 12). The text is
one in which “the objective analysis of capital and the subjective analysis of class behavior come
together, where class hatred permeates his science” (p. 9). Capital, he claims, leaves “no
possibility, even in the form of a paradox, of the dynamism of this process by hypostatizing it, by
rigidifying it,” while “the originality, the happiness, the freshness of the Grundrisse rest entirely

with its incredible openness” (p. 61). The contradictions of capitalism developed in Capital are
replaced in the Grundrisse with antagonism and subjectivity.
The pedagogical form of the Grundrisse, even the presentation or linearity of the logic is
a linearity of presentation, but one determined by “a class logic that governs this angle of attack
of exposition” (p. 61). The inquiry and presentation of capital is both the antagonism of classes
and production of differential production of subjectivity. Yet the motor of difference is based on
antagonism and the presentation of the theoretical process of inquiry is “a whole series of
operations of the displacement of the subject and the dislocation of the theoretical field” (p. 77).
This is because “class struggle does not know synthesis, it only knows victories and defeats” (p.
76). It’s a collective knowledge of wins and losses, advances and retreats, which means that
Marx’s method opens the path to a theory of surplus-value, which isn’t a linear intellectual
unfolding of a developmental learning but rather a studying that shifts subjectivity and
structurally.
This is so because, unlike presentation and learning, reality itself “is not linear” but is
rather “transformed continually” as it “draws into its movement the antagonism of collective
forces that knowingly exercise power,” reality and history continually move the horizon of
research. Rather than developmental learning, it’s a studying defined by “a qualitative leap,” by
“collective relations of force” and is thus “not skeptical, but dynamic and creative” (p. 56). And
because surplus-value is the essence of capital, this means that capital itself is subjectivity. There
is no predetermination, no evolution or unraveling; only a process of studying animated by the
indeterminacy and unpredictability of the class struggle. Through disruption and subversion—in
thought and practice, in the mind and flesh—new real categories are born and new antagonisms
are animated. Negri refers to this as a process of constitution, one that results from antagonistic
struggles by different and oppositional subjective forces and that moves from “the relation
between the use value of abstract knowledge and the need for a transformation of knowledge” (p.
47). Such a transformation is the production of reality.
In sum, for Negri what is important in the Grundrisse is not so much the formulation of
new categories and concepts, but rather “the definition of social antagonism” (p. 187). The
pedagogy that dominates the Grundrisse, on this reading, is one of relentless studying organized
around and for communism. Yet it advances, retreats, and suspends the developmental learning
at work in the book. In fact, the two pedagogies are constellated together. Marx doesn’t finalize
one aspect of research and move to the next logical one. Instead, each inquiry uncovers a distinct
antagonistic subjectivity and struggle, which renews and compels the formulation of categories
and concepts, until the next antagonism displaces the field of studying and learning altogether.
Learning here is subordinated to studying insofar as the presentation itself is structured by and
productive of antagonism. Whereas the knowledge presented in Capital is fixed and rigid, for
Negri, the knowledge of the Grundrisse is open and indeterminate.
The pedagogies of Capital
While Althusser finds that the texts later compiled as the Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts of 1844 totally idealist, for Althusser (1971) the transitional works “like The
German Ideology, or even the Grundrisse” were “very ambiguous”, too Hegelian and thus not
marxist in their theory, science, philosophy, or praxis (p. 45). The epistemological break or
rupture he justifies in For Marx (2005) happens as clarity overtakes ambiguity. The break is twofold: it entails “founding the theory of history (historical materialism)” as well as producing “a

new philosophy (dialectical materialism)” that happened when he “broke with his erstwhile
ideological philosophy” (p. 33). In his later work “Marx in his Limits” Althusser (2006) says the
labeling was imprudent but it still rings true. It does so not because of Marx’s intellect but as a
result of Marx’s participation in the organizations and parties of the class, especially the First
International, in that these themselves produced the rupture he would later write as Capital (p.
31). Earlier, it’s conceived as a break that Marx himself produced that emphasizes clarity.
In his contribution to Reading Capital, Althusser (1979) focuses on the scientific nature
of Capital, it’s new epistemology and framework that changes the world. While many criticize
Althusser’s rigidity, I contend that pedagogically and politically Althusser proposes in content
and form of Capital that depends on how we engage it. He presents this, I suggest, through two
forms of reading-writing. He begins by noting that the book is a series of lecture notes from a
class in 1965, which haven’t been edited to create (the illusion of?) a completed work, and
instead remain “the mere beginnings of a reading,” which therefore retain “their rhythm, their
didactic or oral style, but also and above all in their discrepancies, the repetitions, hesitations and
uncertain steps in their investigations” (p. 13). By doing so, “all the risks and advantages of this
adventure are reproduced; so that the reader will be able to find in them new-born the experience
of a reading; and so that he in turn will be dragged in the wake of this first reading into a second
one which will take us still further” (p. 14). Both kinds of reading-writing and speaking-listening
practices block learning and studying together, but the stated goal is clarity for both.
The first practice, however, is not marxist, and occurs when “Marx reads his
predecessor’s discourse (Smith’s for instance) through his own discourse. The result of this
reading through a grid… is merely a summary of concordances and discordances, the balances of
what Smith discovered and what he missed” (p. 19). This is a reading in which “the logic of a
conception of knowledge in which all the work of knowledge is reduced in principle to the
recognition of the mere relation of vision; in which the whole nature of its object is reduced to
the mere condition of a given” (p. 19). To remain here is to remain trapped in “the mirror myth
of knowledge as the vision of a given object or the reading of an established text, neither of
which is ever anything but transparency itself” (p. 19). The truth of an object is within the object,
and is obtained by abstracting the truth from the object, just like “gold is extracted (or abstracted,
i.e., separated) from the dross of earth and sand in which it is held and contained” (p. 38). Here,
knowledge’s “sole function is to separate, in the object, the two parts which exist in it, the
essential and the inessential—by special procedures whose aim is to eliminate the inessential
real… and to leave the knowing subject only the second part of the real which is its essence,
itself real” (pp. 38-9). The essence is hidden, invisible, and we discover or grasp it in the “most
literal sense: removing the covering, as the husk is removed from the nut” (p. 39).
The second reading, which we could call a marxist reading, focuses not on sights and
oversights, but the connections or flows between the visible and invisible, and which therefore
concerns the possibility of sight itself, in which “non-vision is therefore inside vision, it is a form
of vision and hence has a necessary relationship with vision” (p. 22). Hence, we can discover a
new conception of knowledge, as against immediate and essential reading, in which the text
mirrors knowledge. Instead, we have knowledge and the production of knowledge, the
movement of knowledge produced through the flesh of collective subjectivities in struggle. What
does the invisible within the visible mean? That writing and reading “can only pose problems on
the terrain and within the horizon of a definite theoretical structure, its problematic, which
constitutes its absolute and definite conditions of possibility,” but moves beyond them at the
same time (p. 26). This reading is one in which the eye doesn’t see the field, but sees itself

seeing, or listens to its listening! “It is literally no longer the eye (the mind’s eye) of a subject
which sees what exists in the field defined by a theoretical problematic: it is this field itself
which sees itself in the objects or problems it defines” (p. 26). The invisible isn’t the outside of
the visible, which would only necessitate an immediate reading of the unread. Instead, “the
invisible is defined by the visible as its invisible, its forbidden vision: the invisible is not
therefore simply what is outside the visible,” “the outer darkness of exclusion—but the inner
darkness of exclusion, inside the visible itself because defined by its structure” (p. 27). The limits
to the text are internal to it; they represent the traces of study and invite us back to inquiry with
its meandering messiness and unpredictable lineages.
This marxist reading doesn’t come from “a mental decision to change ‘view-points’”
(28), but instead involves a “real transformation of the means of production of knowledge” (p.
29). Knowledge is something active that’s produced through writing and reading. Marx does this
through “play” with Hegel, which “is not just raffishness or sarcasm, but the action of a real
drama, in which old concepts desperately play the part of something absent which is nameless, in
order to call it onto the stage in person” (p. 31). This is like science, which lives, by the extreme
attention it pays to the points where it is theoretically fragile” (p. 31). Science isn’t about
uncovering something that was previously covered, but about listening to silences in the content
and the form, perhaps by listening to the nuance or timbre of the matter of writing, which is
thought in action.
This approach to reading-writing is philosophical and scientific for Althusser, which
means that it questions the relation of the text to its object while questioning the object itself.
This entails changing our understandings of fundamental processes, “the ‘simplest’ acts of
existence: seeing, listening, speaking, reading” (p. 16), and revising them against both religious
and empiricist readings, summed up as essentialist or immediate readings. Immediate or
empiricist reading-writing is that of the Young Marx, who believed that we could know a truth
“in black and white” (p. 16) without taking into account the structure in which the text is situated
and with which it does its work. Althusser notes that in Capital that Marx’s inquiry-study and
presentation-learning are again constellated. Marx, he tells us, is above all “a reader who reads
to us; and out loud;” Marx “felt the need to fill out his text by reading out loud, not only for the
pleasure of quotation, or through scrupulousness in his references… not only because of the
intellectual honesty which made him always generously recognize his debts… but for reasons
deeply rooted in the theoretical conditions of his work of discovery” (p. 18). This is a doubled
reading, with each form operating on different pedagogical logics.
The question is whether each reading produces a more accurate form of knowledge or
whether it always entails rendering an opacity transparent. In fact, it does both. We produce
knowledge, but there is always a dislocation between the real object and the object of
knowledge. As David Backer (2019) writes, “what the theory says is there is never really there:
the two are dislocated” (p. 29). Knowledge is circular, in that it produces something that was
already there, but we don’t merely turn around in the circle “because this circle is not the closed
circle of ideology, but the circle perpetually opened by its closures themselves” (Althusser, 1979,
p. 75). As Backer (2019) puts it, Althusser’s interpretation of Marx’s theory of Capital is not
only about being open; its distinguishing feature “is that it fights for openness” (p. 52). One way
Althusser’s writing does this, Backer says, is by employing “scare quotes,” which indicates that
“the word has competing concepts. In other words, the person who writes the word isn’t
innocent, nor the person reading it. They work with a problematic that arises out of their
moment, experience, and their material situation” (p. 36). They are, in other words, indications of

ongoing study, of irresoluteness, of the openness of antagonistic materialism and the communist
struggle.
We can see another way that Althusser’s claims in Reading Capital constellates both
pedagogies by his argument that Marx’s concepts develop both synchronically and
diachronically. Both are forms of presenting and producing knowledge amount to learning, but
with different scientific procedures and different knowledge effects. Althusser presents the
production and effect of knowledge through two forms: synchronic and diachronic.
“Synchrony,” he writes, “represents the organizational structure of the concept sin the thoughttotality or system,” while “diachrony” is “the movement succession of the concepts in the
ordered discourse of the proof” (p. 73). When only read or written synchronically, “the hierarchy
of concepts determines to ‘diachronic order of their appearance” (p. 73). Concepts are presented
linearly as building blocks for further concepts. Yet diachrony is when concepts are developed
through displacement as they take on different contingencies.
In their application of these scientific procedures, David Kristjanson-Gural (2009) argues
that neither can be used without the other without producing errors. The “synchronic error is the
failure to take into account the effect of new contingencies on the meaning of the terms within
the logical totality at a given moment or level of abstraction,” while the “diachronic error results
from comparing logical claims at two different moments or levels of analysis without taking into
around the different meanings and relationships between concepts that apply at each level” (p.
15). Kristjanson-Gural shows that the synchronic error results in the very notion that that Marx
leaves us with a “transformation problem” (e.g., Marx can’t account for the transformation of
value into price), and the diachronic error results in a total rejection that supply and demand
simultaneously “both cannot and must directly affect the value of commodities” because both
contradictory claims “belong to distinct stages in the expansion of the logical totality” (p. 28).
Both errors occur when only one pedagogical logic is applied; thus the key to Althusser’s reading
of Capital insists on the dialectical and contingent or tactical deployment of presentation and
inquiry. This is why Marx himself blocks them together and never claims to present a unified
and ahistorical theory, science, philosophy, or practice.
Conclusion: The open inconclusiveness of Capital
Negri’s critique of Capital is not total in any way. But he insists that the later work’s method of
presentation—the pedagogy of learning with its developmental logics and seemingly progressive
conceptual creations—overtakes and subsumes the method of inquiry—the pedagogy of studying
that responds, revives, and displaces such concepts through antagonistic differences within the
totality of capital. The class struggle over the working day is replaced by the composition of the
organic composition of capital, and the struggle is not defined by exploitation but “on private and
competitive capital” rather than “social capital” (p. 27). Capital’s categories are “objectified,”
which “blocks action by revolutionary subjectivity” (p. 8). Even if Capital is organized more
along the lines of learning, on my reading there are still traces of antagonistic subjectivity, of
differential manifestations of struggle, and the interruption of studying in presentation. There are
traces of studying throughout.
One example is the very last chapter of the first volume of Capital, chapter 33. This
chapter is concerned with Wakefield’s theory of colonialism. It’s a rather dry and short chapter,
and one that follows from Marx’s most succinct case and call for communist revolution, where
Marx turns away from the historical empirical inquiry and presents a succinct dialectical and

historical materialist analysis of the tendency of capitalist accumulation and how the
contradictions of capitalism might result in particular revolutionary paths. Marx begins with the
scattered private property of individuals in petty manufacture, handicraft, and peasant labor.
Together, these prevent the concentration of means of production, division of labor, and
cooperation of labor (social labor), the formation of the collective laborer (the antagonistic
subject), and so remains locked within the production and circulation of use-values.
Halfway through this first paragraph, Marx (1967) notes that “at a certain stage of
development,” these property relations create “the material agencies for its own dissolution,”
producing “new passions” that “the old social organization” prevents (p. 714). Individual private
property is annihilated by capital and, through theft, colonialism, slavery, repression, and so on,
centralized and concentrated by capital. At the same time, this produces the collective laborer
and a social process of work that develops a universal (although not undifferentiated) social
worker. As capital concentrates the means of production and the proletarian class, the latter’s
rebellious nature grows. Capital is now a fetter on production:
The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the ode of production, which has sprung
up and flourished along with and under it. centralization of the means of production and
socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their
capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private
property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated. (p. 715)
He ends with a speculation on the relative violence of both revolutionary processes. Whereas the
centralization and concentration of capital was “incomparably more protracted, violent and
difficult than the transformation of capitalistic private property… into socialized property” (p.
715). The former entailed the dispossession, theft, and exploitation of the many by the few, while
the latter might entail the expropriation of the few by the many. That’s how he ends this brief
penultimate chapter. Yet it’s not an empirical contradiction but an articulation of contradictions.
There’s nothing indicating a mechanical or deterministic prediction.
Why not end here? Why end the book with an examination of a rather boring
examination of Ebbon Wakefiels’ theory of colonialism? One widely accepted answer is that
Marx is engaging with Hegel. This is a claim David Harvey introduced in The Limits to Capital
and which he still uses to explain the transition. Harvey’s (1982) claim is that the chapter is a
Hegelian formulation by proposing “colonial solutions” to demonstrate that “there is no outer
solution to the internal contradictions of capital” (p. 413).
In the final chapter, Marx appreciates Wakefield’s theory for its honesty. Wakefield
doesn’t try to hide the violence of colonialism or exploitation through notions of equal and free
rights. He explicitly acknowledged the need for dispossession. Marx ends volume one by
reminding us again that the capitalist mode of production and accumulation are based on
expropriation, colonialism, genocide, and slavery. I read this as a return to studying and to the
antagonistic class forces that animate marxist theory and practice. Ending with chapter 33, I
suggest, implicitly tells us that the contradictions of capitalism—which can’t be solved within
capitalism—can be pushed back and transformed through colonialism and imperialism. It’s an
opening to return to studying, to inquiry. The dialectic in chapter 32 may seem teleological and
closed, but the brief exposition in chapter 33 undoes that. There are no guarantees, no objective
determinants divorced from subjective differences or the class struggle.

Another example is the famous chapter on the working-day, where Marx announces that
“between equal rights force decides” (p. 225). Up until now Marx has taken bourgeois political
theory at face value, but here the reality of the struggle forces a leap so that the struggle for a
“normal” working day is just that: a struggle between two antagonistic class forces. The chapter
presents a narrative of the struggle in England throughout the 19th century, one that’s filled with
contradictory alliances and betrayals, advances and defeats. It’s a struggle waged not by
individuals but by collectives: capitalists and workers together through the mediation of the state.
Moreover, in a footnote he acknowledges the role that Protestant ideology played in the process
“by changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays” (p. 262 f2), and later the role of
slavery. There’s nothing predictable or deterministic about any of this. This is what we affirm
when we say that class struggle is the motor of capitalism and the motor of revolutionary
transformation.
Capital and the Grundrisse block together learning and studying differently, but Capital
is an open text as well, one that doesn’t lock knowledge in place but returns us to a state of
suspension, of study. Agamben (1995) makes a connection between studying and stupidity in the
Idea of Prose, where he wrote that “those who study are in the situation of people who have
received a shock and are stupefied by what has struck them, unable to grasp it and at the same
time powerless to leave hold” (p. 64). Without the power to leave the realm of study, the studier
remains a state of perpetual wonder. This is not a passive inactivity because of its ceaseless
rhythmic sway, a swaying that is itself ceaseless because of the constant deferral of any end point
(determinant, expert and conclusive knowledge). Marx returns us to study, as I hope this paper
does.
Acknowledgements: Some of the material from this article was originally published in ‘Marx’s
pedagogies then and now: Research and Presentation’ on LiberationSchool.org.
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